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The Process of Electoral Reform
in Canada: Democratic and
Constitutional Constraints
Yasmin Dawood*

I. INTRODUCTION
This article considers the process by which electoral reform ought to
take place, focusing in particular on the democratic and constitutional
constraints that bear on electoral reform. It addresses two inter-related
issues: first, whether any particular process, such as a referendum, is
required as a normative matter to establish the democratic legitimacy of a
given reform; and second, whether a constitutional amendment involving
provincial consent is required to implement electoral reform.
This article argues, with respect to the first issue, that while no one
process is mandated for electoral reform, it is nevertheless important
for the process to be and appear to be democratically legitimate. Part I
considers a number of possible mechanisms, including a citizens’
assembly, a commission, a referendum and an all-party parliamentary
committee, and it does so by drawing on provincial and comparative
international experience with electoral reform. Part II argues that although
no single process is required, the process must be and appear to be
democratically legitimate. In order for the process of electoral reform to be
democratically legitimate, it must visibly follow the norms of political
neutrality, consultation, and deliberation.
*
Canada Research Chair in Democracy, Constitutionalism, and Electoral Law and
Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Toronto. I am grateful to Benjamin
Berger, Adam Dodek, Peter Hogg, Sonia Lawrence, Emmett Macfarlane, Carissima Mathen,
Pippa Norris, Michael Pal, Peter Russell, Lorne Sossin, Carolyn Tuohy, an anonymous reviewer,
and participants at the Osgoode Constitutional Cases Conference, the Asper Centre Conference on
the State of Canada’s Constitutional Democracy, and the University of Toronto School of Public
Policy and Governance Roundtable on Electoral Reform for helpful comments and discussions.
Special thanks to Jennifer Che, Maryam Shahid and Logan St. John-Smith for superb research
assistance. The research for this article was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada.

354

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Part III turns to the question of whether a constitutional amendment
involving provincial consent is required for electoral reform. It argues
that prior to the Senate Reference1 the Supreme Court had recognized in
many of its cases that the electoral system is political in nature but
nonetheless subject to certain constitutional limits. Part III sets out these
constitutional limits (which include voter rights and the principle of
provincial representation) and argues that the majority of the current
electoral reform proposals would not violate these limits. Given the
Court’s statements that the choice of electoral model falls within the
domain of Parliament, Part III claims that Parliament would be able to
change the electoral system without provincial consent under the Court’s
prior precedents.
Part III then addresses the Senate Reference to determine whether the
Court’s decision and, in particular, its expansive use of the concept of
“constitutional architecture” has changed the legal landscape such that
Parliament would now be required to secure provincial consent under the
general amending formula in order to usher in electoral change. This article
argues that given the salient differences between Senate reform and electoral
reform, it would be possible for the Supreme Court to distinguish the Senate
Reference and find that its earlier precedents on the electoral system remain
valid. The article concludes that electoral reform can likely proceed without
a constitutional amendment involving provincial consent, provided that the
reform is consistent with certain constitutional requirements.

II. PROCESS OPTIONS FOR ELECTORAL REFORM
Prior to the federal election, the Liberal Party pledged “that 2015 will
be the last federal election conducted under the first-past-the-post voting
system”.2 There are many alternatives to the current first-past-the-post
(“FPTP”) electoral system, including, for instance, various kinds of
proportional representation (“PR”), mixed voting schemes such as the
mixed member proportional (“MMP”) system, and preferential ballots.3
1
Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] S.C.J. No. 32, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Senate Reference”].
2
See Liberal Party of Canada, “A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class” (2015) at 27,
online: Liberal Party of Canada <https://www.liberal.ca/files/2015/10/New-plan-for-a-strong-middleclass.pdf>.
3
For a discussion of the most common options suggested in Canada, see Harold J. Jansen &
Alan Siaroff, “Regionalism and Party Systems: Evaluating Proposals to Reform Canada’s Electoral
System” in Henry Milner, ed., Steps Toward Making Every Vote Count: Electoral System Reform in
Canada and Its Provinces (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2004), at 43-63; Louis Massicotte,
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These systems all have advantages and disadvantages, and any choice
among them involves a consideration of various trade-offs. In addition,
electoral reform has partisan implications in the sense that different
systems can augment or depress a party’s chances of electoral success.
Not only are there many kinds of electoral systems, there are also
many possible processes of electoral reform. This section examines a
number of process options for electoral reform, drawing on provincial,
federal, and international experience.
1. Citizens’ Assembly
One process option is the citizens’ assembly, previously used in both
British Columbia and Ontario.4 In British Columbia, a citizens’ assembly
selected the single transferable vote (“STV”) system for the province in
2004.5 The Assembly was composed of 160 randomly selected members,
and during its year-long deliberation it held 50 public hearings.6 In Ontario,
an all-party committee studying the electoral system recommended the
establishment of a Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform. This assembly
recommended in 2007 that the province adopt an MMP system.7
2. Electoral Reform Commission
Another possible mechanism for electoral reform is to establish a
commission. In 2004, for instance, the New Brunswick Commission on
Legislative Democracy recommended that the province adopt a regional
MMP system.8 In 2004, Prince Edward Island established an eight-person
“Electoral Reform in Canada” in André Blais, ed., To Keep or Change First Past the Post
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), at 112-39.
4
Mark E. Warren & Hilary Pearse, eds., Designing Deliberative Democracy: British
Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
5
Canada, Library of Parliament, Electoral Reform Initiatives in Canadian Provinces (Ottawa:
Library of Parliament, August 2009), at 2, online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/
content/lop/researchpublications/prb0417-e.htm>.
6
British Columbia Citizen’s Assembly on Electoral Reform, Making Every Vote Count: The
Case of Electoral Reform in British Columbia, Final Report (Victoria: British Columbia Citizen’s
Assembly on Electoral Reform, December 2004), at 1, 10, online: <http://citizensassembly.arts.ubc.ca>.
7
Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, One Ballot, Two Votes: A New Way to Vote
in Ontario (Toronto: Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform, 2007), at 1, online: Ontario Citizens’
Assembly on Electoral Reform <http://www.citizensassembly.gov.on.ca>.
8
New Brunswick, Commission on Legislative Democracy, Final Report and Recommendations
(Fredericton: Commission on Legislative Democracy, December 2014), at 17, online: Elections
New Brunswick <http://www.electionsnb.ca/content/dam/enb/pdf/cld/CLDFinalReport-e.pdf>.
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commission, which was charged with refining an MMP system for the
province.9 Earlier, in 2003, a one-person commission headed up by former
provincial Chief Justice Carruthers recommended that Prince Edward
Island should adopt either an MMP or STV system.10
A number of independent organizations and bodies have also
developed policy proposals for electoral reform. For example, the Law
Commission of Canada recommended the adoption of an MMP system
at the federal level.11 The Broadbent Institute recently issued a report
recommending proportional representation.12 Fair Vote Canada promotes
the introduction of an element of proportional representation into
elections for all levels of government in Canada.13
3. Referendum
Canada can also usher in electoral reform by holding a referendum.
There have been four provincial referendums on electoral reform to date,
though none of them have been successful. In British Columbia, a
referendum on the proposed STV system was held in 2005. The proposal
received 57 per cent support across the province, which fell short of the
60 per cent threshold that was required.14 A second referendum on the
STV system, which was held in 2009, only garnered 39 per cent support
among the ballots cast.15 In Ontario, the proposed MMP system was
subject to a referendum held during the 2007 provincial election. The
referendum failed with support from only 36.9 per cent of voters.16 In
November 2005, Prince Edward Island held a plebiscite on a proposed
9
Commission on Prince Edward Island’s Electoral Future, 2005 Commission on Prince
Edward Island’s Electoral Future Final Report (Charlottetown: Commission on Prince Edward
Island’s Electoral Future, 2005), at 5, online: Government of PEI <http://www.gov.pe.ca/photos/
original/elec_elecrfrm05.pdf>.
10
Commission on Electoral Reform in Prince Edward Island, 2003 Prince Edward Island
Electoral Reform Commission Report (Charlottetown: Commission on Electoral Reform in Prince
Edward Island, 2003), at 98, online: Government of PEI <http://www.gov.pe.ca/photos/
original/er_premier2003.pdf>.
11
Law Commission of Canada, Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada (2004),
online: Law Commission of Canada, <http://publications.gc.ca>.
12
David Moscrop, An Electoral System for All: Why Canada Should Adopt Proportional
Representation (2016), online: Broadbent Institute <http://www.broadbentinstitute.ca/democratic_
renewal>.
13
Fair Vote Canada, About (FAQ) (2015) online: Fair Vote Canada <http://campaign2015.
fairvote.ca>.
14
Electoral Reform Initiatives, supra, note 5, at 2.
15
Id., at 3.
16
Ontario Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral reform, supra, note 7, at 15.
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MMP system.17 Only a third of the electorate voted, and of those who
voted, only 36 per cent endorsed electoral reform, which was far short of
the required threshold of 60 per cent of the vote provincially.18
At the national level, there have only been three referendums.19
The first one considered the issue of prohibition;20 the second considered
the issue of conscription during World War II; and the third considered
the proposed constitutional changes in the Charlottetown Accord.
A majority of voters opposed the Accord nationally, and the referendum
was defeated in six provinces.21 There have also been a number
of referendums at the provincial level on other topics, including the
creation of Nunavut in 1982 and 1992,22 and Quebec’s two secessionist
referendums in 1980 and 1995.23
4. All-Party Parliamentary Committee
The Liberal government has established an all-party parliamentary
committee to propose a new electoral system. While parliamentary
committees have been used in the provinces as part of the process of
proposed electoral reform, these committees are usually paired with at
least one other mechanism, such as a referendum, a citizens’ assembly, or
a commission. For example, in Ontario, an all-party parliamentary
committee recommended that the details of electoral reform be
determined by a citizens’ assembly, the results of which were put to a
referendum. Likewise, in Quebec, a parliamentary committee worked in
conjunction with an eight-member citizens’ committee.24

17
Legislative Assembly of Prince Edward Island, White Paper on Democratic Renewal
(Charlottetown: Legislative Assembly of Prince Edward Island, July 2015), at 9, online: Legislative
Assembly of Prince Edward Island <http://www.assembly.pe.ca/democraticrenewal/>.
18
Id.
19
Vincent Lemieux & S.J.R. Noël, “Referendum” The Canadian Encyclopedia (June 6, 2015)
online: The Canadian Encyclopedia <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/referendum/>.
20
Benoit Dostie & Ruth Dupré, “‘The People’s Will’: Canadians and the 1898 referendum
on alcohol prohibition” (2012) 49 Explorations in Economic History 498, at 503.
21
Lawrence Leduc, “Canada’s Constitutional Referendum of 1992: A ‘Great Big No’”
(1993) 12:3 Electoral Studies 257, at 263.
22
Patrick Boyer, Direct Democracy in Canada: The History and Future of Referendums
(Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1992), at 180.
23
Lemieux & Noël, “Referendum,” supra, note 19.
24
Electoral Reform Initiatives in Canadian Provinces, supra, note 5, at 11.
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5. Comparative Experience
The comparative experience shows that a variety of process options
have been used to implement electoral reform. There have only been six
major reforms between 1980 and 2010 in established democracies
(New Zealand, Japan, France (twice) and Italy (twice)).25 In addition,
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have adopted new electoral systems
for their Parliaments.26
In 1993, New Zealand shifted from FPTP to MMP through two
referendums.27 France changed its electoral system to a proportional
system through new legislation in 1985. After a change in government in
1986, the previous voting system was restored through legislative action.28
Likewise Japan reformed its electoral system in 1994 through legislative
change.29 Electoral reform was accomplished in Italy in the 1990s through
a referendum,30 and in 2005 through the enactment of new legislation.31 In
Scotland and Wales, the MMP system was brought about through the
devolution legislation passed by the U.K. House of Commons.32

III. DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND ELECTORAL REFORM
Given the variety of process options that have been used for electoral
reform efforts in Canada and globally, this article argues that no single
process is mandated for electoral reform. Although some people argue that
a referendum is essential for the legitimacy of electoral reform,33 the
choice of a referendum is not necessarily a neutral one. Based on the

25
Alan Renwick, The Politics of Electoral Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), at 5-6, 10. Established democracies are defined as countries that were independent
democratic states at the end of the “second wave” of democratization in 1962.
26
Matthew Shugart & Justin Reeves, “Electoral System Reform in Advanced Democracies”
Oxford Bibliographies (May 4, 2015), online: Oxford Bibliographies <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com>.
27
Renwick, The Politics of Electoral Reform, supra, note 25, at 194.
28
Id., at 103.
29
Id., at 179.
30
Id., at 176.
31
Id., at 124.
32
R.J. Johnston & C.J. Pattie, “Campaigning and split-ticket voting in new electoral
systems: the first MMP elections in New Zealand, Scotland and Wales” (2002) 21 Electoral Studies
583, at 584.
33
For a discussion of whether formal amendments to the Constitution must be subject to a
referendum, see Richard Albert, “The Conventions of Constitutional Amendment in Canada” (2016)
53 Osgoode Hall L.J. 399.
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provincial experience with referendums on electoral reform, it is likely that
a national referendum on electoral reform would meet a similar fate.34
Instead, the key issue is whether the process that ushers in such
reform is and appears to be democratically legitimate. To achieve
democratic legitimacy, the process should visibly follow three norms:
first, political neutrality (or non-partisanship); second, consultation; and
third, deliberation. Electoral reform differs from the passage of ordinary
legislation because it sets out the very ground rules by which political
power is attained. For this reason, the process of electoral reform must be
held to a higher standard of democratic legitimacy.
The passage of the Fair Elections Act35 under the prior Conservative
government provides an instructive example of a process that was
illegitimate because it was partisan, hasty, and closed to the views of
citizens, experts, Elections Canada, and the opposition parties.36 The
Liberal government is not exempt from process concerns simply because
it secured a mandate for electoral reform by winning the 2015 election.
There are many reasons why people voted for the Liberal Party,
including the simple objective of removing the Conservative Party from
power. It is important not to conflate a Liberal win with support for
electoral change. Because electoral reform is inevitably tied to political
and partisan calculations, it is essential that the chosen process be and
appear to be democratically legitimate by satisfying the norms of
political neutrality, consultation, and deliberation.
1. Political Neutrality and Non-Partisanship
The norm of non-partisanship ensures that the process is as neutral as
possible, which, in turn, helps to prevent the governing party from
entrenching itself by selecting rules that favour it at the expense of the
other political parties.37 This norm is the most difficult to achieve, in
large part because the choice of process can have a determinative impact

34
Lawrence LeDuc, “The Failure of Electoral Reform Proposals in Canada” (2009) 61:2
Political Science 21, 36-39.
35
Fair Elections Act, S.C. 2014, c. 12.
36
Remarks of Professor Yasmin Dawood on Bill C-23, An Act to Amend the Canada
Elections Act, before the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, Parliament of
Canada (March 31, 2014).
37
For a discussion of partisan self-dealing in the electoral context, see Yasmin Dawood,
“Electoral Fairness and the Law of Democracy: A Structural Rights Approach to Judicial Review”
(2012) 62 U.T.L.J. 499, at 508-18.
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on the kind of substantive reform that is ultimately adopted. The choice
of process can be as partisan as the choice of electoral system.
Any majority government must guard against the perception of selfserving entrenchment by ensuring that the process is as non-partisan as
possible. For example, critics denounced the initial Liberal-dominated
composition of the proposed all-party committee on the grounds that the
government was “stacking the deck” by planning to have the committee
recommend preferential balloting — a system which in the past had been
endorsed by Prime Minister Trudeau.38 A preferential balloting system
would have given the Liberals even more seats in the recent election: a
gain of 40 seats according to one analysis39 and a gain of 20 seats
according to another analysis.40
One way to achieve the actuality and appearance of political neutrality
is to ensure that the other political parties agree with the proposed reform.
In the event that a consensus is impossible, it would be important for
the proposed reform to secure the support of political parties that
collectively achieved at least a majority, and preferably a super-majority,
of the popular vote in the 2015 election. The Liberal government decided
to adopt the NDP’s proposal that the committee’s composition follow
the proportion of the popular vote rather than the share of seats in the
House. Under the new committee structure, there are five Liberals, three
Conservatives, two New Democrats, one member of the Bloc Québécois
and Green Party leader Elizabeth May, all of whom have voting rights. 41
The government would need the support of at least either one or two of
the opposition parties on the committee in order to propose a change to
the electoral system.
The neutrality of the electoral reform process can also be undermined
by substantive commitments that skew the process towards any particular
outcome. For instance, the government’s identification of certain “desired
outcomes” could be viewed as skewing the process for or against certain
electoral systems. One desired outcome is “[s]table governments that

38
Kady O’Malley, “Can this special committee on electoral reform be saved?” Ottawa
Citizen (May 16, 2016) online: Ottawa Citizen <http://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/kady-canthis-special-committee-on-electoral-reform-be-saved-spoiler-alert-maybe-but-maybe-not>.
39
Eric Grenier, “Change to preferential ballot would benefit Liberals” CBC News
(November 26, 2015) online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/>.
40
Paul Fairie, “How the Liberals would have won more seats with ranked ballots” The Globe
and Mail (November 18, 2015) online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
41
Aaron Wherry, “Liberals back down on electoral reform committee, support NDP
changes” CBC News (June 2, 2016) online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca>.
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respond to the needs of Canadians”.42 There is a great deal of debate,
however, as to whether PR leads to more or less stability as compared to
systems such as FPTP.43 The government also announced five guiding
principles for electoral reform, and these too could be interpreted to
favour some systems over others. For instance, the third principle,
“[s]upport accessibility and inclusiveness for all eligible voters,
including by avoiding undue complexity in the voting process”,44
disadvantages the MMP system, which has been described by some as
being too complex for voters.
2. Consultation and Deliberation
The norms of consultation and deliberation ensure that the process has
canvassed and considered in detail a wide array of opinions and options.
Consultation is connected to the democratic ideal of participation by
citizens,45 while the norm of deliberation requires that a “collective decision
should in some sense be justified by public reasons — that is, reasons that
are generally convincing to everyone participating in the process of
deliberation.”46 According to the government, the parliamentary committee
will engage in “meaningful and extensive consultation with Canadians”
and will also seek expert testimony on constitutional and legal issues.47
The parliamentary committee must report its findings and
recommendations to the House of Commons by December 1, 2016.48
However, this self-imposed timeline is unnecessarily hasty, and thereby
undermines the norm of deliberation. Given the importance and scale of
electoral reform, the deliberative and consultative processes should
unfold over a longer time period. Elections Canada also requires time to
implement electoral reform, and to have the opportunity to provide
commentary on the proposed changes.49 More time would also allow the
42
Government of Canada, “Motion to Propose All-Party Parliamentary Committee On
Electoral Reform” (May 11, 2016), Government of Canada News, online: Government of Canada News
<http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1063799> [hereinafter “All-Party Committee Motion”].
43
Dennis Pilon, The Politics of Voting: Reforming Canada’s Electoral System (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 2007), at 62-65, 139.
44
All-Party Committee Motion, supra, note 42.
45
Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1970).
46
James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (MIT
Press, 2000), at 5.
47
All-Party Committee Motion, supra, note 42.
48
Id.
49
Canada, Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, 2016-2017 Report on Plans and Priorities,
(2016) at 7, online: Elections Canada <http://www.elections.ca/res/rep/rpp/rpp2016/rpp2016_e.pdf>.
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government to set up an additional process — whether a commission,
referendum, or citizens’ assembly — that would enhance the actuality
and appearance of democratic legitimacy. Legislative committees on
electoral reform at the provincial level have often been paired with one
or more additional process options, which serve to augment the norms of
political neutrality, consultation and deliberation.

IV. IS A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT REQUIRED?
Is a constitutional amendment required to bring about electoral
reform? Or to be more precise: does Parliament have to follow the
general amending formula, which requires approval by at least seven
provinces representing 50 per cent of the population, or can Parliament
amend the Constitution unilaterally to bring about electoral reform?
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in the Senate Reference, there
was every indication that Parliament had the power to change the
electoral model unilaterally under section 44 of the Constitution Act,
1982,50 subject only to certain constitutional constraints as described in
Part III.1 below. Section 44 provides that, “Subject to sections 41 and 42,
Parliament may exclusively make laws amending the Constitution of
Canada in relation to the executive government of Canada or the Senate
and House of Commons.” Parliament has unilaterally amended the
Constitution with respect to certain electoral matters, such as enlarging
the number of seats in the House in the Fair Representation Act.51
There is a threshold question of whether electoral reform can be
undertaken through Parliament’s power in section 9152 to enact ordinary
legislation (like the Canada Elections Act53) or whether it amounts to a
constitutional amendment that Parliament must undertake through
section 44 (like the Fair Representation Act). Although both options
involve unilateral action by Parliament, the latter involves a constitutional
amendment while the former does not. This article assumes that electoral
reform would require a constitutional amendment because most reform
proposals would involve a modification of the constitutional text.54

50

Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
Fair Representation Act, S.C. 2011, c. 26.
52
See Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.) 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
53
S.C. 2000, c. 9.
54
Certain reforms, such as a change to preferential balloting, could arguably be
implemented without touching the constitutional text.
51
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In the wake of the Senate Reference, there is no question that the
Court could find that a change in the electoral system requires a
constitutional amendment that follows either the general amending
formula in section 38 or the unanimous consent formula in section 41. In
the Senate Reference, the Court used the idea of an underlying
“constitutional architecture” to block reforms that altered the “fundamental
nature and role” of the Senate.55 As described in more detail in Part III.2
below, the Court held that reforms such as consultative elections would
significantly alter the Senate’s fundamental nature and role as an
independent and complementary legislative body of sober second
thought.56 The Court could use a similar logic to find that electoral
reform amounts to the kind of constitutional amendment that requires
substantial provincial consent.
The issue addressed in this article, however, is whether it is possible
to interpret the Senate Reference in such a way that the Court can remain
consistent with its prior assessment that changes to the electoral system
fall within the domain of Parliament. I argue that senate reform and
electoral reform are distinguishable, and the Court could therefore find
that Parliament can proceed with electoral reform under section 44.
The next section addresses the constitutional constraints imposed by the
Court on the electoral process. Parts III.2 and III.3 describe the Court’s
decision in the Senate Reference and explore its possible application to
electoral reform.
1. Constitutional Constraints on the Electoral Process Prior to the
Senate Reference
As I have argued elsewhere, the electoral process can be viewed as
having a dual constitutional-political nature.57 The Court has recognized
this duality, finding that the electoral process is political, yet subject to
certain constitutional limits. The Court has acknowledged the political
dimension of the electoral system, noting that Parliament has the power
to choose the design of the electoral system and the details of how the
process works. Many aspects of the electoral system are governed by

55
This analysis is drawn from Yasmin Dawood, “The Senate Reference: Constitutional
Change and Democracy” (2015) 60 McGill L.J. 737 [hereinafter “Dawood”].
56
Senate Reference, supra, note 1, at paras. 57-60.
57
Yasmin Dawood, “Democracy and Dissent: Reconsidering the Judicial Review of the
Political Sphere” (2013) 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 59.
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ordinary legislation, such as the Canada Elections Act and the Electoral
Boundaries Readjustment Act.58
At the same time, there is a constitutional aspect to the electoral
process. The first set of constitutional constraints involves the
distributional requirements for provincial representation. Sections 51
and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867, set out the rules for the distribution
of representation among the provinces. Section 51A, which is known as
the Senate floor rule, provides that no province will have fewer seats
in the House of Commons than it has in the Senate. Parliament has
changed the distribution of seats, and the size of the House, by passing
constitutionalized statutes like the Fair Representation Act.59
The second set of constitutional limits involves the right to vote. The
right to vote is explicitly protected by section 3 of the Charter, which
provides that every citizen has the right to vote for elections for the House
of Commons or a provincial legislature and to be qualified for membership
in those houses.60 In addition, the Court has extended the right to vote
beyond the act of filling out a ballot. As I have argued elsewhere, the
Court has recognized a “bundle of rights” associated with the section 3
right to vote,61 including the right to effective representation62 and the right
to meaningful participation in a democracy.63
The right to effective representation was announced by the Supreme
Court in Reference re Provincial Boundaries (Saskatchewan), a case
concerning the constitutionality of Saskatchewan’s electoral boundaries.64
In a five to three decision, McLachlin J. (as she was then) held on behalf
of the majority that the electoral boundaries did not infringe the section 3
right to vote. According to the Court, “the purpose of the right to
vote enshrined in s. 3 of the Charter is not equality of voting power per se,

58

R.S.C. 1985, c. E-3.
S.C. 2011, c. 26.
60
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 3 [hereinafter “Charter”].
61
This section is drawn from Yasmin Dawood, “Democracy and the Right to Vote:
Rethinking Democratic Rights under the Charter” (2013) 51 Osgoode Hall L.J. 251, at 254-55.
62
Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchewan), [1991] S.C.J. No. 46,
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.), revg [1991] S.J. No. 111 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter “Saskatchewan
Reference”].
63
Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] S.C.J. No. 84, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995
(S.C.C.), affg [1992] F.C.J. No. 921 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Haig”]; Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912 (S.C.C.), revg [2000] O.J. No. 3007 (Ont. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Figueroa”].
64
Saskatchewan Reference, supra, note 62.
59
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but the right to ‘effective representation’.”65 The Court has also recognized
the right to “play a meaningful role” in the democratic process. This right
was first described in a 1993 decision, Haig v. Canada,66 and later
elaborated at length in Figueroa v. Canada.67 Writing for the majority in
Figueroa, Iacobucci J. stated that section 3 includes not only a right to
effective representation, but also “the right of each citizen to play a
meaningful role in the electoral process”.68 The Court has recognized two
additional democratic rights in its election law cases — the right to equal
participation69 and the right to a free and informed vote.70 These rights
appear to be derived by the Court from an overarching constitutional
commitment to the principle of democracy.71
The Court has also recognized the political dimension of the electoral
system. In Harper v. Canada72 and R. v. Bryan,73 for example, the majority
judgments were highly deferential to Parliament because they saw the
electoral process as being presumptively “political”. In Harper, the
majority asserted that the workings of the electoral system are a “political
choice” and that the specific details of such political choices should be left
for Parliament to determine.74 Since Parliament has the right to “choose
Canada’s electoral model”, it is incumbent on the Court to defer to
Parliament.75 Similarly in Bryan, the majority stated that the Court ought
to take a “natural attitude of deference” with respect to election laws.76
In Figueroa, LeBel J. posited that the “government has fairly wide
latitude in choosing how to design the electoral system and how to
65
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combine the various competing values at play.”77 The choice among
various representative options “should be viewed as a matter of political
and philosophical preference in which it is not this Court’s role to
intervene”.78 In addition, the Constitution “does not require a particular
kind of democratic electoral system, whether it is one that emphasizes
proportionality and the individual aspects of participation or one that
places more emphasis on centrism and aggregation, to be frozen in
place”.79 Justice Iacobucci similarly noted that “The Charter aside, the
choice among electoral systems, is as LeBel J. states, a political one —
and not one in which the Court should involve itself.”80 In addition, he
noted that “the Charter is entirely neutral as to the type of electoral
system in which the right to vote or to run for office is exercised.”81 The
purpose of section 3 is “to protect the right of each citizen to play a
meaningful role in the electoral process, whatever that process might be”.82
The idea that the Constitution does not require a particular electoral
system was confirmed in a recent Quebec Court of Appeals decision,
which held that the FPTP system is not unconstitutional.83 In Gibb v.
Attorney General of Quebec, the court held that while the electoral
system can be challenged in the courts if it violates constitutional rights,
the FPTP electoral system does not violate the right to vote, the right to
equality, nor the right to effective representation.84 Following past
Supreme Court precedents, including Figueroa, the court stated that the
“Constitution does not require a particular electoral system”.85
To summarize, a change from one electoral system to another would
likely require a constitutional amendment. Given various statements by
the Court, however, Parliament could undertake to change the electoral
system unilaterally under section 44, subject to the constitutional limits
described above. Most electoral reform options would satisfy these
constitutional limits in that they would provide effective representation
and meaningful participation, in addition to adhering to the distributional
77
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principles for provincial representation. The remaining question is
whether the Court’s decision in the Senate Reference has changed
Parliament’s ability to bring about electoral reform under section 44.
2. The Senate Reference
In the Senate Reference, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the government’s proposal to unilaterally reform
various aspects of the Senate.86 The Court rejected the government’s
position, holding that consultative elections and senatorial term limits
could only be implemented by following the “7/50 rule”. The “7/50
rule”, which is found in section 38 of the Constitution Act, 1982, requires
the consent of the Senate, the House of Commons, and the legislative
assemblies of at least seven provinces representing half the population
of all the provinces. The abolition of the Senate would require the
unanimous consent of Parliament and all the provinces. The wealth
and property qualifications of Senators could be repealed in part by
Parliament, although a full repeal would require the consent of the
Quebec legislature.87
Central to the Court’s opinion was the idea that the Constitution
has an “internal architecture” or “basic constitutional structure”.88 The
Constitution does not simply comprise the constitutional text itself; it
must also be understood by reference to previous constitutional cases and
the historical context.89 The concept of the Constitution’s “internal
architecture” proved to be of crucial importance since it served as a bar
to changes in constitutional practices that do not result from changes to
the constitutional text. That is, the Constitution can be amended through
changes to its architecture even though the text of the Constitution is left
untouched.90
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For this reason, the Court concluded that holding consultative elections
for Senate seats would amount to a constitutional amendment even though
the proposal did not contemplate a change to the formal text of the
Constitution. To determine whether or not a particular proposed change
amounted to a constitutional amendment, the Court examined whether or
not the reform in question would alter the “fundamental nature and role” of
the institution.91 For the Court, the Senate’s fundamental nature and role is
that it is a “complementary legislative body of sober second thought”.92
The Court referred to its decision in the Upper House Reference for the
idea that the Senate was intended to be “a thoroughly independent body
which could canvass dispassionately the measures of the House of
Commons”.93 The Senate was designed to be independent from the
electoral process.94 By being appointed, Senators would not have to
consider the short-term political objectives that carry weight in an elected
arena.95 In addition, the Senate was meant to be a “complementary
legislative body”, rather than a “perennial rival of the House of Commons
in the legislative process”.96 By design, Senators did not have a “popular
mandate — they would not have the expectations and legitimacy that stem
from popular election.”97 Consultative elections would bestow democratic
legitimacy on the Senate and would thereby enable it to systematically
block the legislation of the House of Commons.98 The Senate, however,
was not designed to be a systematic obstacle to legislation.99 The Court
concluded that as a result of consultative elections, the “Senate’s
fundamental nature and role as a complementary legislative body of sober
second thought would be significantly altered”.100
The Court also determined that the “7/50 rule” (the general amending
procedure in section 38) was the default procedure for constitutional
amendment. The other procedures for constitutional amendment in Part V
were all exceptions to the general procedure. According to the Court, the
general amending formula is based on the idea that “substantial provincial
91
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consent must be obtained for constitutional change that engages provincial
interests”101 The purpose of the amending formula is to “constrain
unilateral federal powers to effect constitutional change”.102 As Peter Hogg
notes, the Court adopted a similar approach in the Supreme Court
Reference,103 holding that because the Supreme Court has become
constitutionalized over time, Parliament cannot unilaterally make changes
to the Court.104 While the Court’s approach to constitutional amendment is
consistent with democratic principles of deliberation and dialogue, it can
be faulted for freezing the constitutional order into place particularly since
the concept of constitutional architecture can be applied to almost any
proposed change to the institutions of government.105
Some commentators have concluded that a constitutional amendment
involving provincial consent is required for most electoral reform
proposals. Michael Pal argues, for instance, that because the Senate
Reference limited Parliament’s power to unilaterally reform the Senate
under section 44, the same constraint would apply to electoral reform.106
In his view, changing the electoral system from first-past-the-post would
affect provincial interests, and would constitute a fundamental change to
the House and the Constitution.107 He argues that less-involved reforms
such as moving to a preferential balloting system may be permitted by
unilateral Parliamentary action, but that most reforms would require
provincial consent. Yaakov Roth and Jonathan Roth argue that the
constitutional architecture “plainly presupposes district-based elections”,
and that the first-past-the-post electoral system has always determined
the make-up of the House of Commons.108 In addition, wholesale changes
to the electoral system engage provincial interests, not least because the
101
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“strength and composition of provincial delegations in the House of
Commons could shift dramatically under a reformed electoral system”.109
3. Is Electoral Reform Analogous to Senate Reform?
Although the Court could undoubtedly find that electoral reform
requires provincial consent, it is also possible for the Court to interpret
the Senate Reference in such a way that would permit Parliament to
engage in unilateral electoral reform. The argument is that because
electoral reform can be distinguished from senate reform, it does not
require a constitutional amendment involving provincial consent. As
such, electoral reform could be treated like Parliament’s unilateral
decision to expand the size of the House in the Fair Representation Act.
This analysis is supported by the Court’s pre-Senate Reference cases,
which consistently found that the choice of electoral model lay with
Parliament, and that the particular model of the electoral system was not
itself determined or set by the Constitution.
(a) Constitutional Provisions
As a start, there are notable differences in the way that the
Constitution treats the Senate and the electoral system, respectively.
There are a number of provisions in the Constitution Acts, 1867 and
1982, which pertain to the Senate. In the Constitution Act, 1867, the
following provisions reference the Senate and/or Senators: sections 17,
18, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, and 51A.
In the Constitution Act, 1982, the following provisions reference the
Senate and/or Senators: sections 38, 41, 42, and 44. By contrast, there is
much less reference to the electoral model in the Constitution. The FPTP
system is not explicitly mentioned, although there are references to
electoral districts. This difference in constitutional treatment reflects the
fact that the Senate was indispensable to the creation of the constitutional
order in a way that the electoral system was not.
To the extent there is a reference to the electoral system in the
Constitution, the provision suggests that Parliament has the power to
change it. Section 40 of the Constitution Act, 1867, provides in part that
“Until the Parliament of Canada otherwise provides, Ontario, Quebec,
Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick shall, for the Purposes of the Election
109
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of Members to serve in the House of Commons, be divided into electoral
districts as follows: ... .” Section 41 also provides that all election laws in
the provinces shall apply to the election of members to serve in the
House for those same provinces “[u]ntil the Parliament of Canada
otherwise provides.” Although these sections are spent, they suggest that
Parliament has the prerogative to make changes to the electoral system.
Section 40 also provides that each electoral district is “entitled to
return One Member” for Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick. All
electoral districts in Nova Scotia are entitled to return one member with
the exception of the “County of Halifax [which] shall be entitled to
return Two Members”. Yaakov Roth and Jonathan Roth suggest that this
provision might be interpreted to mean that electoral districts are bound
to only have one representative,110 in which case the MMP system would
not be permitted. However, the provision also begins with the statement
“Until the Parliament of Canada otherwise provides”, which suggests
that the entirety of section 40, including the requirement that each district
return one member, could be changed by Parliament unilaterally.
Another possible argument is that the preamble of the Constitution
prohibits electoral reform. Yaakov Roth and Jonathan Roth argue that the
“core structure of our electoral system is constitutionally entrenched”
because the Founders adopted a “Constitution similar in principle to that
of the United Kingdom” as provided in the preamble.111 The U.K. House
of Commons, they argue, has used first past the post for hundreds of
years, and the Canadian House of Commons has done so since the
country’s inception. In response, Denis Pilon argues that in 1867 the
United Kingdom used multi-member ridings, and other kinds of methods
including the semi-proportional limited vote.112 For this reason, the
preamble should not be used to prohibit electoral reform undertaken by
Parliament.
The language pertaining to constitutional amendment in the
Constitution Act, 1982 also suggests a difference between electoral reform
and Senate reform. Section 44 states that “[s]ubject to sections 41 and 42,
Parliament may exclusively make laws amending the Constitution of
Canada in relation to the executive government of Canada or the Senate or
the House.” Section 42(1)(b) provides that the general amending formula
110
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(the “7/50 rule”) must be followed with respect to “the powers of the
Senate and the method of selecting Senators”. According to the Court in
the Senate Reference, section 42(1)(b) covers the implementation of
consultative elections.113 The phrase “method of selecting Senators” does
not apply to only the formal appointment of Senators but also includes the
entire selection process, including the compilation of a list of candidates
from the election.114 For this reason, the implementation of consultative
elections is subject to the general amending formula.115
By contrast, the amendment provisions do not refer directly to the
electoral system. They do, however, place a constraint on electoral
reform. Section 42(1)(a) provides that the general amending formula
must be followed with respect to any change to the “the principle of
proportionate representation of the provinces in the House of Commons
prescribed by the Constitution”. This provision suggests that as long as
any proposed electoral reform does not deviate from these distributional
principles, Parliament would not need to follow the general amending
formula. No doubt this provision would rule out certain forms of “pure”
PR, but it would still allow for other kinds of PR, mixed voting systems,
and other models such as preferential ballots to be adopted.
(b) The Fundamental Nature and Role of the Electoral System and the
House
A central feature of the Court’s Senate Reference was the idea that the
proposed consultative elections would alter the Senate’s “fundamental
nature and role as a complementary legislative body of sober second
thought”.116 The Court used the “fundamental nature and role” analysis
to determine whether consultative elections — a reform that could be
implemented without changing the constitutional text — nevertheless
amounted to a constitutional amendment.
The “fundamental nature and role” analysis was also used by the
Court to determine if the proposed change was the kind of measure
that engaged provincial interests. If a particular measure alters the
fundamental nature and role of the Senate, it engages provincial interests
and thereby triggers the general amending formula. For instance, the
113
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Court asked “whether the imposition of fixed terms for Senators engages
the interests of the provinces by changing the fundamental nature or role
of the Senate”.117
If, however, a proposed measure does not change the Senate’s
fundamental nature and role, it does not engage provincial interests,
and it therefore can be implemented unilaterally by Parliament under
section 44. For instance, the Court found that the repeal of the net worth
requirement for senators did not change the Senate’s fundamental nature
and role, and therefore did not engage the interests of the provinces.118
The Court stated that “[n]either level of government acting alone can
alter the fundamental nature and role of the institutions provided for in
the Constitution. This said, those institutions can be maintained and
even changed to some extent under ss. 44 and 45, provided that their
fundamental nature and role remain intact.”119 According to the Court,
section 44 “does not permit amendments that engage the interests of the
provinces by modifying the Senate’s fundamental nature and role”.120
The key question, then, is whether electoral reform changes the
fundamental nature and role of the electoral system and/or the House of
Commons. The fundamental nature and role of any electoral system is to
act as a translation device between votes and seats, and thereby enable
representation. Although there are differences among the various models,
these details do not change the “fundamental” nature and role of the
electoral system. In the Senate Reference, the Court stressed that the
Senate would, as a result of consultative elections, change from a
complementary body of sober second thought to an institutional rival
with a popular mandate of its own. A change from one kind of electoral
system to another, however, would not amount to a fundamental change
of this order. The electoral system would still be translating votes into
seats, and its relationship to the other major institutions of government
would remain the same.
Alternatively, does a change to the electoral system involve a change
to the fundamental role and function of the House? The House would
still be a representative body under the mainstream reform options that
are usually considered.121 The new system would have to ensure that the
117
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principle of proportionality among provinces is maintained, so there is
some constraint on the options that are permissible. In addition, the
proposed reform would have to abide by the Charter requirements in
terms of protecting the right to vote, equality rights, and the bundle of
derivative rights such as the right to effective representation, the right to
meaningful participation, the right to equal participation, and the right to
a free and informed vote. Most reform options would abide by these
requirements, and the fundamental nature and role of the House as a
representative body would not be altered.122 Although different systems
differ in the details in terms of the kind of representation that is provided,
the Court’s standard does not inquire at this level of granularity. It
is concerned instead with the fundamental nature and role of an
institution and under most reform options the House would continue to
be a representational body that is designed to reflect the national and
collective will.

V. CONCLUSION
There are a number of possible options for the process by which
electoral reform could take place in Canada, including via a citizens’
assembly, a commission, a referendum, and/or a parliamentary committee.
This article has argued that although no single option is mandated, the
process must visibly follow the norms of political neutrality, consultation
and deliberation in order for the proposed reform to be democratically
legitimate.
This article also concluded that electoral reform can likely proceed
without a constitutional amendment involving provincial consent,
provided that the reform is consistent with certain constitutional
requirements. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the
electoral model is political in nature, and that the choice of electoral
model falls within the domain of Parliament. Although the electoral
system is subject to certain constitutional limits — such as voter
rights and the principle of provincial representation — most electoral
reform proposals would not violate these limits. While the Senate
Reference could be interpreted to require a constitutional amendment
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with provincial consent for electoral reform, it is also possible for the
Court to distinguish electoral reform and find that its earlier precedents
on the electoral system remain valid.
In addition, there are significant disadvantages to holding that electoral
reform requires a constitutional amendment with provincial consent. Such
a course could have a number of unintended consequences, such as
requiring provincial consent every time electoral boundaries are redrawn.
The 7/50 rule could be imposed every time new seats are added to the
House, particularly since such a change affects how many seats are allotted
to each province. Many of the electoral rules in the Canada Elections Act
arguably affect provincial interests, and these changes could also be
subject to the general amending formula. Given how difficult it is to
amend the Constitution in Canada,123 such a course would only serve to
freeze the constitutional order.124 In my view, the Court’s approach in its
law of democracy cases is preferable: the electoral process is generally
treated as falling within the domain of Parliament but subject to certain
constitutional limits. The Supreme Court not only can, but should, adopt a
narrow reading of the Senate Reference that would allow it to distinguish
electoral reform from Senate reform.
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